7 Essential Insights from the Israeli Military’s Oct. 7 Report: What You Need to Know

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently shared its findings from the investigation into the events surrounding the attack on October 7, 2023. Although the initial probes started back in November 2023, a more comprehensive investigation was directed by outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi in March 2024. The report did not include recommendations; those will be addressed by the incoming chief of staff, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir.

OCTOBER 7 HASN’T ENDED. ONE YEAR LATER, 101 HOSTAGES ARE STILL BEING HELD IN GAZA

1. The Scale of the Attack

According to the IDF, between 5,000 and 5,600 Hamas militants entered Israel in three waves. They launched 4,696 rockets and mortars, resulting in the deaths of 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign visitors, and 415 security personnel. In total, 251 individuals were taken hostage and brought to Gaza. Senior IDF officials indicated that a major failure was the miscalculation of Hamas’s intentions and their preparedness for this large-scale assault.

2. Planning the Attack

The IDF revealed that Hamas didn’t act on impulse; they prepared for this attack over nearly seven years. The planning evolved from a foundational concept created in November 2016, with formal approval for execution coming in July 2019. The chosen date, October 7, 2023, was significant as it fell during the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, a time of celebration. Prior dates like Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur were also considered but discarded.

3. Timeline of Events on October 7

On the morning of October 7, preparations by Hamas began late the previous night. They launched their infiltration at 6:29 a.m., breaking through the security barrier. By 6:43 a.m., the IDF declared a state of emergency, and combat escalated rapidly. Throughout that morning, thousands of militants infiltrated Israeli territory, taking advantage of what the IDF later deemed critical failures in their response.

4. Misjudgments of Threats

Before the attack, the IDF primarily focused on threats from Iran and Hezbollah, categorizing Hamas as a lower priority. The expectation was that Hamas didn’t aim for a full-scale conflict. This belief led to a lack of preparation for such a brutal attack. The IDF found that the emphasis on Hamas’s rocket capabilities diverted attention away from the potential for ground attacks.

5. Intelligence Oversights

Israel’s intelligence was slow to recognize the seriousness of Hamas’s plans. They collected information on Hamas’s intentions for a large attack, but existing assumptions deemed it unlikely. In the months leading up to October 7, alerts about Hamas’s training activities failed to reach senior leaders, limiting their situational awareness.

6. Missed Warning Signs

On the night of October 6, unusual activities, including the activation of Israeli SIM cards in Gaza, went unnoticed. Although there were signs that Hamas leaders were gathering, the intelligence community did not elevate their alert status. They later acknowledged that had they re-evaluated the situation, they might have acted to prepare for an imminent Hamas operation.

7. Air Force Readiness

The Israel Air Force (IAF) was found to meet existing readiness standards but struggled due to overwhelming rocket fire from Hamas. The IDF acknowledged that distinguishing between their troops, civilians, and attackers became a critical challenge during the chaos of that day.

The IDF’s assessments outlined that they were unprepared for the extent and brutality of the October 7 attacks. Reflecting on their failures, senior officials stated that they had relied too heavily on specific intelligence and did not consider broader scenarios. The lessons from this incident stress the need for a deeper understanding of threats and a stronger focus on preventive measures against future attacks.

Source link