On July 23, 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released an important Advisory Opinion about climate change and state obligations. However, it barely mentioned the term “disaster.” While the Court referred to it three times, those references lacked depth or legal substance. This is noteworthy. It shows how the international legal system often views disasters as isolated events rather than symptoms of deeper issues related to structural inequality.
This Advisory Opinion came from a request by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 77/276. It sought clarification on how states should protect the climate and the consequences of their inaction. This resolution was aimed at addressing the disproportionate harm faced by vulnerable populations, particularly those least responsible for climate change. It, along with Resolution 76/300—which recognized the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment—forms an essential legal framework. Together, they provide a Global South perspective that redefines climate harm as a legal injury, making inaction a breach of duty.
Despite some progressive elements, the Court still used the term “natural disaster.” This term suggests that these events are random and beyond human control. By doing so, the Court unintentionally reinforces outdated ideas that separate disasters from their social and political roots. Labelling climate catastrophes as “natural” minimizes the role of systemic issues like economic exploitation and racial inequality.
Historically, international disaster law has treated disasters as exceptions—events triggered by nature and managed through humanitarian aid. But the ICJ’s Opinion challenges this view by stating that greenhouse gas emissions create legal responsibilities for states. Climate-related harms should be seen not just as accidents but as results of state failures, putting the responsibility squarely on them.
The Court emphasized that states have obligations to prevent harm and cooperate in tackling climate change. It recognized the cumulative nature of climate harms, clarifying that a state can be held accountable even if it is part of a larger global problem. This acknowledgment is crucial, especially in understanding how these intertwined responsibilities can be legally enforced.
Interestingly, the Advisory Opinion highlights obligations that extend to all of humanity. This is particularly significant for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and other marginalized communities, often hardest hit by climate-related events. The court argues that if these events are foreseeable and preventable, they are not disasters in the traditional sense; they are failures of governance.
The mention of a right to a clean, healthy environment opens up avenues for rethinking disaster law. Current frameworks, like the Sendai Framework, often treat disasters as external shocks rather than outcomes of ongoing inequalities.
In conclusion, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion might not frame disasters in the traditional sense, but it offers a significant shift in how we view legal responsibility concerning climate change. It invites us to see disasters as reflections of ongoing inequalities rather than random events. As we move forward, we must consider how this Opinion can guide legal advocacy and social movements to redefine justice, particularly for those most affected by climate change.
For a deeper understanding of the history and effects of climate-related legal obligations, you can explore resources like the UN’s climate action framework.
